The previous lecture notes ("Using Valence and Arousal …") focus on respondents' reports of their emotional reactions to specific objects, presidential candidates. In the following sections, I examine the more typical situation in which data on emotion inventories is collected: quality of life surveys that specify no object of emotion. 1 In such surveys the emotion inventories appear to be used as measures of psychological well-being along with a variety of other measures, most notably selfreported happiness (Bradburn, 1969) and life satisfaction (Campbell and Converse, 1978) . In analyzing data from these surveys, I move from a focus on the global and vague concept of quality of life to a more specific, albeit equally vague, concept of stress. I use life event inventories as the source of stress (the stressors) and responses to emotion inventories as a measure of the psychological consequences of the stress produced by the life events.
Two Models of the Relation between Stress and Affect
A hallmark of the literature of on social stress is that the consequences of stress are limited to negative life events such as the death of a spouse (Hobfall and Spielberger, 1987) . 2 This position runs counter to earlier conceptions of the stress process that view both positive and negative life events as sources of stress (Holmes and Rahe, 1967; Selye, 1956) . The reason for this shift in perspective is empirical. The results of countless studies suggest that negative life events lower scores on measures of psychological well-being. In contrast, positive life events, such as a job promomotion, appear to have no effect, either positive or negative, on well-being.
An important feature of this research is that the reports of negative emotion, such as the DSM measures of depression, dominate scales of psychological well-being. When researchers analyze the reports of negative and positive emotion separately, they find the 1 Because of the absence of information on the objects of emotion, some researchers might regard the emotion inventories as reports of "mood" rather than "emotion" (e.g., Frijda, 1994) . While not disputing the need to attend to the differences among the variety of affects, I ignore this an similar distinctions on the grounds that most data on emotion inventories would not permit the study of these subtle conceptual differences. 2 The same event, of course, can be viewed positively or negatively depending on the context of the event (Wheaton, 1994) and the way the event is resolved (Turner and Avison, 1992) . I use the terms "positive" and "negative" fairly loosely, therefore, to refer to the way an event would be perceived typically or on average by the population studied. I term as "neutral" events that are ambiguous or for which good and bad consequences tend to balance out. Although one can categorize some events on a priori grounds-e.g., the death of a spouse versus an increase in one's finances--I use the data on the relation between the event and reports of emotional experience to determine its valence. Although reliance on the data to determine the status of an event introduces a certain degree of circularity, I attempt to break out of this circle by deciding when one of many failed predictions represents not the invalidty of a decision about the valence of a life event but a general pattern of no support for the theory.
consequences of negative life events are limited to an increase in negative affect. Negative life events neither increase nor decrease positive affect. Moreover, the relation between positive life events and positive affect remains a mystery because those studies that examine the effects of both positive and negative life events either do not use reports of positive affect as part of their measure of well-being or do not separate positive and negative affect when both are present. Unless a negative sign is specified, the reader should assume that the effect is positive.
The model in Figure 1 treats positive and negative emotions as measures of positive and negative affect, respectively. The only effect of life events on emotion specified is the positive effect of negative events on positive emotion through the effect of negative events on negative affect. The model is incomplete, however, because of the paucity of research on the relation between positive events and positive emotion. Consequently, I attach a question mark ("?") to the arrow to leave open the possibility of a positive, negative, or no effect. This model, of course, relies on the rotated solution to represent the two-dimensional structure of emotion inventories. Figure 2 contains a theoretical model of the relation between life events and the emotions reported in quality of life surveys. Based on the unrotated solution, it specifies valence and arousal as latent variables that mediate life events and reported emotion. It is a more complex model than the one specified in Figure 1 . The reason for this complexity is that, according to this model, life events affect both valence and arousal. In this respect, life events resemble the slides studied by Lang and his associates. According to the theory impled by model in Figure 2 , each life event, depending on its valence, will increase, decrease, or, in the case of "neutral" events, have no effect on valence. Both positive and negative events, on the other hand, will increase arousal. 3 Using the results from eqs. 5 and 6, one can derive implications about the relations between positive and negative life events and positive and negative emotion. These implications provide alternative explanations of the research results described above. In addition, they imply a hypothesis about the relation between positive life events and positive emotion. First, the strong, positive relation between negative life events and negative emotion occur because these events combine to reduce valence and increase arousal. Second, the apparent low or non-existent effects of positive events on negative emotion occur because their positive effect on valence, which decreases negative emotion, is canceled by their positive effect on arousal, which increases negative emotion. Third, negative events appear to have a weak or non-existent effect on positive emotion because their negative effect on valence, which reduces positive emotion, is again canceled by their (Campbell and Converse, 1978) . LR Chi-square = 1540.48, n = 3,536, df = 197, GFI = .965, AGFI = .942 positive effect on arousal, which increases positive emotion. Finally, positive events should increase positive emotion because they increase both valence and increase arousal. This last relation represents the hypothesis to be tested in the next section.
Results of an Analysis of the Effects of Life Events on Reported Emotion.
To compare the results generated by the two models, I estimated two structural equation models using data from the 1978 American Quality of Life Survey (Campbell, et. al., 1978) . These data consist of 3,536 face to face interviews of a representative sample of the continental United States conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. I used the ten-item Bradburn affect -balance scale to measure valence and arousal and positive and negative affect (Bradburn, 1969) . The scale contains five positve emotions and five negative emotions. Table 6 contains the reliabilities and two sets of factor loadings for each item for the two models. The first model treats each item as a two-dimensional measure of valence and arousal, while the second model divides the items into two sets of unidimensional measures of positive and negative affect .
(Compare these loadings with those in Table 2 .) Table 7 contains estimates of the effects of three life events indexes of positive, negative, and "neutral" or ambiguous events, plus the respondent's age and sex, on the latent affect variables as defined by the unrotated and rotated models. The life events questions ask whether a particular event, such as death of the spouse occurred within the five year period prior to the interview. The respondent's sex is a dummy variable with The survey asked for events that occurred within the past five years rather than the more typical period of one year. *Coefficients are partial, standardized regression coefficients. Starred coefficients (*) are statistically significant (p < .01).
men coded 1 and women coded zero. Although information on the number of events is available, I used each event coded as yes (1) or no (0) to construct the indexes. 4 Consistent with the predictions based on the model in Figure 2 , the results on the left-hand side of Table 7 show that the three-item indexes of positive, negative, and neutral events increase, decrease, or have no (net) effect on valence. All three indexes, however, have significant positive effects on arousal. Age has significant positive and negative effects on valence and arousal, respectively, although the age's effect on arousal is substantially stronger than its effect on valence. With respect to sex, there is no. difference between men and women's valence, but men score slightly lower than women on arousal
The results for the rotated model on the right hand side of Table 7 show, consistent with the literature, that negative life events increase negative affect. Contrary to the literature, negative events significantly reduce positive affect, but the coefficient is small. Consistent with the prediction derived from the model in Figure 2 , positive events significantly and substantially increase positive affect. Neutral events also have significant positive effects on both positive and negative affect, although the coefficients are relatively small. While these last results may seem difficult to interpret from the perspective of the rotated model in Figure 1 , they follow from the prediction of the unrotated model in Figure 2 that all events increase arousal. Indeed, all the relations on the right-hand side of Table 7 are best viewed as artifacts of the effects of age and sex on valence and arousal.
Results of an Analysis of the Effects of Change on Reports of Emotion
The theoretical basis for the positive effect of life events on emotional arousal in Figure 2 is that the change engendered by life events, whether positive or negative, increases arousal. This position, of course, is consistent with Selye's (1956) application of his concept of physiological stress to the social life of humans. It also is consistent the attempt made by Holmes and Rahe (1967) to use magnitude estimation methods to assign weights to different life events based on the perception of the amount of change produced by the life event. 5 This conception has fallen into disfavor due largely to the apparent finding that the effect of life events is limited to the effect of negative events on negative affect. Nevertheless, the concept of stress as change continues to lurk in contemporary formulations, albeit one informed more by stress as a mechanical rather than physiological phenomenon (Wheaton, 1994) .
To test the validity of this interepretation, I analyzed the effects on the Bradburn scale of respondents' reports of the amount and desirability of change in eight life domains during the year preceeding the interview. The data come from the 1978 and 1979 Edmonton Area Surveys. They consist of 345 and 346 face-to-face interviews, respectively, conducted by the University of Alberta's Population Research Laboratory. The domains include work, finances, housing, schooling, health, family life, friendships, and personal habits. Although the domains lend themselves theoretically to the index construction, the correlations across domains for both the amount and desirability of change are sufficiently strong to permit the the construction of two scales: the amount of change and the desirability of change (including no change). 6 5 The idea of stress as a non-specific physiological response clearly resembles the idea of undifferentiated arousal as a component of emotional response. It should be noted, however, that Selye's physiological research focused on the generalization across different noxious stimuli. The generalization of stress to include positive as well as negative events seems to have occurred in Holmes and Rahe's application of Selye's ideas in their development of a stress index. 6 See note 14 for a discussion of the difference between an index and a scale. The areas of change consist of (a) "In the work that you do or in the situation at work," (b) "In your economic situation, (including finances, obligations, standard of living)," (c) "In your place of residence or in your housing conditions," (d) "In your educational situations," (d) "In your own or your family's health," (e) "In your family life," (f) "In your friendships and social life," and (g) "In your personal habits." The amount of change was measured on a four-point scale (1 = no change, ... 4 = many changes); desirability of change (or no change) is measured on a seven-point scale (1 = very undesirable ... 7 = very desirable). *Coefficients are partial, standardized regression coefficients. Starred coefficients are statistically significant (p < .01). Table 8 contains estimates of the effects of these two scales, plus the respondent's age and sex, on the latent affect variables generated by unrotated and rotated models of the ten emotions in the Bradburn affect-balance scale. The results for the unrotated model consist of a simple and easily interpreted pattern of effects. Consistent with this model, the amount of change positively affects arousal but not valence, while the desirability of change positively affects valence but not arousal. From the perspective of the rotated model, these findings translate, first, into positive effects of the amount of change on both positive and negative and positive affect, and, second, into positive and negative effects of the desirability of change on positive and negative affect, resepctively.
I regard these results, however, as an artifact of the effects of the amount and desirability of change on valence and arousal. The effects of age and sex largely replicate the results reported in Table 7 , except that the effect of sex is no longer statistically significant. 7
The Results of An Analysis of the Correlations between Husbands' and Wives' Emotional Experience
The final data set I examine comes from the 1980 Edmonton Area Couple Survey. These data consist of face-to-face interviews conducted separately with the husband and wife for a total of 178 couples (Northcott and Kinzel, 1980) . Table 9 contains the crossspousal correlations between factors based on the husband's emotional experience and factors based on his wife's emotional experience. I use a shortened version of the Bradburn affect-balance scale to generate these factors since the 1980 survey deleted five of the items from usual ten-item scale. 8 Unlike the comparable correlations between the reactions Reagan and Carter presented in previous notes ("Using Valence and Arousal … "), the unrotated model yields a more complex picture than the rotated one. The "same" cross-spousal variables correlate positively, while the "different" cross-spousal variables correlate negatively. That is, husband's valence and arousal correlate positively with wife's valence and arousal (r = .376, .333), while husband's valence and arousal correlate negatively with wife's arousal and valence (r = -.294, -.236), although the latter correlation does not quite attain statistical significance. In the case of the right-hand side of Table 9 , on the other hand, the only appreciable correlation is the strong positive correlation between husband's and wife's negative affect (r = .510).
Despite the apparent complexity of the unrotated solution, I find these results easier to interpret. The cross spousal, same-variable correlations possibly arise from mutual influence processes whereby one spouse's valence positively affects the other's valence, and one spouse's arousal positively affects the other's arousal. Although different causal processes could underlie the negative correlation between one spouse's valence and the other's arousal, one possibility is that the spouse's valence behaves like a life event by affecting both the valence and arousal of the other spouse. According to this interpretation, the low valence of one spouse acts like a negative life event by reducing the other spouse's valence and increasing his or her arousal. Although Gottman (1994) has noted the strong correlation between spouses' negative affect coupled with the absence of a correlation between their positive affect, an interpretation of these results from the perspective of positive and negative affect seems elusive. Instead, all four correlations on the right-hand side of Table 9 are better interpreted as an artifact of the correlations on the left-hand side.
Discussion of the Results of Using Emotional Experience to Measure the Psychological Consequences of Stress
The direction that the research on the stress has taken seems to reflect a morbid preoccupation of psychology and sociology with the misfortunes that are part of the human condition. This preoccupation goes well with the finding that negative events make us feel bad, but positive events have no effect one way or the other. This result, as I argue above, however, is an artifact of using emotion inventories dominated by negative emotions as the criterion variable to measure the psychological consequences of stress. (The reliance on negative emotion as a criterion variable, of course, further illustrates these disciplines' preoccupation with the morbid.) Apart from the skewed image of the human condition conveyed by this focus, the failure to attend to the positive, as well as to the negative, produces misleading results about the effect of life events on emotion. It has led to the conflation of valence with arousal in the conception of both the impact of life events and the structure of emotional experience. Consider, for example, the direction research on the effects of life events might have taken had researchers focused exclusively on measures of positive emotion. As suggested by the results in Table 7 , a "Pollyanna" picture, viewed through "rose-colored glasses," may have emerged in which positive events increase positive affect, but negative events have no effect one way or the other. Such a perspective would be equally unbalanced, although in the opposite direction from the current focus. In order to separate the effects of valence and arousal, researchers need to attend to both positive and negative emotion and to treat each emotion as a measure of both valence and arousal.
General Summary and Discussion

Summary
This paper has attempted to uncover the fundamental dimensions that underlie self-reports of emotional experience. In contrast to the dominant practice of separating positive and negative emotions into two apparently unidimensional scales of positive and negative affect, I propose treating each emotion as a bidimensional measure of valence and arousal. Formally, the two positions differ on the decision whether to rotate the two dimensional factor structure that underlies reports of emotional experience to simple structure. The separation of emotional experience into positive and negative affect rests on the decision to rotate; the treatment of each report of emotional experience as measuring both valence and arousal rests on the decision not to rotate. This formal difference between the two positions poses an apparently subtle problem for attempts to validate one position or the other through the use of correlations between the two factors and various criterion variables. As the section on the algebra of rotation (in the Appendix) shows, rotation automatically changes the correlations between the factors and the criterion variables. A balanced approach, therefore, requires a comparison of the two sets of correlations based on rotated and unrotated structures.
Using results from the analysis of a variety of data sets in both these notes and the previous ones, I suggest that the correlations of a variety of criterion variables with the two unrotated factors, interpreted as valence and arousal, are fundamental, while the correlations of these criterion variables with positive and negative affect are artifacts. In the case of data on the candidacies of Reagan and Carter, the pattern of correlations seems more parsimonious. The first unrotated factor, valence, correlates substantially in the predicted direction with criterion variables easily interpreted as pure measures of valence: candidate feeling thermometers, the appraisal of qualities that indicate either good or bad leadership, the respondent's position on a continuum of party identification that ranges from strong Republican to strong Democrat, and whether the respondent voted for Reagan or Carter. The second unrotated factor, arousal, correlates significantly, if less substantially, with criterion variables readily interpreted as measures of arousal: talk about politics, interest in the campaign, whether the respondent cares who wins the election, the strength of the respondent's identification with a political party, and whether or not the respondent voted in the 1980 election. 9 As evidence of the discriminant validity of the unrotated factors, the correlation of valence and arousal with arousal and valence criterion variables, respectively, are invariably small and usually not significant. Finally, perhaps the best evidence for the construct validity of the unrotated solution is the pattern of cross-candidate correlations that consist of a moderate negative correlation between Reagan and Carter valence and a strong, positive correlation between Reagan and Carter arousal. By comparison, the correlations between these criterion variables and the rotated factors, positive and negative affect, are often puzzling and, therefore, seem best interpreted as an artifact of their correlations with valence and arousal.
In the case of the data from quality of life surveys, the unrotated factors correlate in a theoretically expected way with indexes that essentially count the number of positive, negative, and neutral life events reported by the respondent. The pattern of relations is more complex than the results of the analyses of the emotional reactions to presidential candidates. This complexity occurs, however, because, according to the theory diagrammed in Figure 2 , life events affect both valence and arousal. Consequently, the experience of a life event increases, decreases, or has no effect on emotional valence, depending on whether the event is positive, negative, or neutral. All events, however, increase arousal. These results account for puzzling finding in stress research that has led to a focus on the effect of negative life events on negative emotions. As I argue above, had researchers used measures of positive emotions as a measure of psychological well-being, the focus of stress research would be on the effect of positive events on positive affect. Both of these emphases, real and hypothetical, however, reflect a reliance on correlations that are an artifact of the effects of positive, negative, and neutral life events on valence and arousal. 9 The lower correlations could reflect the fact that arousal is the second component in a principal components analysis of the emotion items. On the other hand, the lower correlations also could occur because these criterion variables combine in varying degrees arousal with "potency" or, less abstractly in the context of the campaign, the respondent's commitment to act politically. The existence of a third dimension, of course, is consistent with the work of Osgood and Tannenbaum (1957) on the semantic differential and subsequent research by Heise and his associates on affect control theory (Heise, 1988) . It also is consistent with the results of a multidimensional scaling of the meaning of emotion words conducted by Shaver and his associates (Shaver, et. al., 1987) . The two dimensions yielded in their first analysis are easily interpreted as valence and arousal. In a second three-dimension solution, they find that the second dimension splits into two that resemble the activation (arousal) and potency dimensions of the semantic differential.
The theory that underlies these relations is based on early conceptions of stress as change. Consistent with this conception, I present evidence that the self-reported desirability of the change in eight life domains of the respondent's life correlates positively with emotional valence but is independent of arousal, while the amount of change correlates positively with arousal but is independent of valence. These correlations more closely resemble those presented in the analysis of the election campaign data because the criterion variables-the desirability of respondent's experience of change and the amount of change experienced-represent relatively pure measures of valence and arousal. Returning to complexity, I present the results of an analysis of couple data that reveal positive correlations between husband and wife valence and arousal and negative correlations between one spouse's valence and the other spouse's arousal. Interpreting these correlations, I argue that the affect of one spouse operates like a life event in its effect on the emotions of the other spouse in the sense that the valence and arousal components of one spouse's emotions affect the valence and arousal components of the other spouse's emotions.
Discussion
In the summary of a recent debate on the merits of the unrotated and rotated solutions in representing the structure of emotions, Diener's (1999) suggestions for future research argues for moving beyond the correlational analysis of self-report data to the use of experimental designs and data on a variety of criterion variables including presumably the physiological and neurological measures that Lang and Cacioppo work with in their respective research programs (Bradley, et. al., 1994; Cacioppo, et. al., 1999) . While I endorse this suggestion (who would not!), I maintain that my correlational analyses of self-report data go a long way toward resolving the debate in favor of valence and arousal, rather than positive and negative affect, as fundamental dimensions of emotional experience. Moreover, proponents of the rotated solution who believe that they can salvage their perspective with criterion variables judged superior to the self-report criterion variables used in this paper should heed the lessons of the section on the algebra of rotation, particularly Eqs. 5 and 6. It presents the formal, substance-free, relation between the two sets of factors. The message of this section is that one can transform the correlations between any criterion variable and positive and negative affect into different correlations between the criterion variable and valence and arousal. It does not matter whether the variable is a cause or effect of emotion, whether the criterion variable occurs naturally or is experimentally induced, whether the criterion variable is a self-report measure or is obtained through by observing the person's behavior, a physiological state, or neural substrate.
Even though the correlations of a criterion variable with positive and negative affect appear to provide prima faciae support for the rotated solution, the transformed correlations of a criterion variable with valence and arousal could lend themselves to an interpretation that is equally plausible and possibly superior. The formal structure of the unrotated solution also can shed light on otherwise puzzling findings that do not involve the correlations between emotion inventories and criterion variables. For example, Diener (1999) describes a finding of strong bipolarity of positive and negative affect in the case of "intense emotional episodes" in contrast to the usual finding of relative independence of positive and negative affect in the case of "typical low-intensity mood experience." Diener attributes these contrasting findings to the different structure of emotional experience during a momentary episode versus a trait-like aggregation of experience over a series of episodes. Without discounting the importance of the traitstate distinction, another explanation is that the variance of arousal variance will be attenuated in intense emotional episodes, particularly when compared to typical situations in which emotion inventories are administered. As both the upper-left and lower-right triangles of equation of the matrix in eq. 7 show (see the appendix), the valence of the person's experience will dominate his or report in such episodes, and, therefore, the correlation between positive and negative affect will approach -1. 10 Readers who discount the results of correlational analyses in favor of the gold standard of experimental data should recall the analysis of the life events data. The results of this analysis raise the possibility that experimental manipulations could affect both valence and arousal. Researchers who restrict their analysis to the effect of a manipulation on either positive or negative affect run the risk of confounding the effect of the manipulation on valence with its effect on arousal..
Although the analysis of emotion inventories comprises the raison d'etre for this paper, future work on valence and arousal as fundamental dimensions of emotional experience should incorporate other measures of emotion. In addition to physiological and neurological variables, the self-report measures should include bipolar items that resemble those used in the semantic differential (Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1957) or selfadministed manikin developed by Lang and his associates (Bradley, et. al., 1994) .
The use of such items could accomplish at least three things. First, it would help address an apparent shortcoming of using emotion inventories to measure valence and arousal. The problem is that this method precludes the occurrence of certain logically possible combinations of valence and arousal-for example, either maximum or minimum valence scores in combination with either maximum or minimum arousal scores. This problem may be more apparent than real since circumplex theories of emotion imply that these combinations are either non-existent or rare. Nevertheless, the use of experimentally independent, (relatively) pure measures of valence and arousal will permit a test of this implication rather than producing it as an artifact of the measurement procedure. Second, the use of pure measures of valence and arousal would permit the investigation of more complex relations between valence and arousal. Although the variables are linearly independent, there is the possibility of a quadratic relation such that 10 The upper-left triangle of the matrix in Eq. 7 consists of the variance-covariance matrix for Reagan positive and negative affect, while the lower-left triangle consists of the variance-covariance matrix for Carter positive and negative affect. Both matrices express these quantities as a linear combination of the variances in valence and arousal. Recall that Eq. 7 simplifies this expression by assuming that the covariance between variance and arousal is zero. With this simplification, the positive affect and negative affect variances equal one another, and the covariance between positive and negative affect equals the variance in arousal minus the variance in valence. As the arousal variance approaches zero, the covariance between positive and negative affect approaches the negative value of the positive and negative affect variances, and, therefore, the correlation between positive and negative affect will approach -1. Naturally, relaxing the assumption of zero covariance between valence and arousal will complicate the picture, but I doubt that the valence-arousal covariance will be large enough to alter it appreciably.
valence increases then declines as arousal increases. 11 Third, the use of bipolar measures of affect permit the investigation of three and possibly more dimensions of affect. 12 I closing, I shall use the "searchlight hypothesis" as developed by Crick (1984) and elaborated by Baars (1988) to attempt a deeper understanding of valence and arousal. The idea of a searchlight is that consciousness involves an attentional process that illuminates a conceptual or semantic space. In applying this hypothesis to valence and arousal, I view valence as the illumination process and arousal as partly a byproduct of the attentional process much as heat is a byproduct of a searchlight's illumination. Adopting Tomkins' (1991) notion of play to describe the loose relations between the modules of biological systems, I suggest that a non-optimal level of urgency is aroused in the attention process.
The idea of arousal as a byproduct of attention speaks both to the analysis of emotional reactions to presidential candidates and to the use of arousal to measure the psychological consequences of stress. The idea of arousal as a byproduct arose in the former endeavor when I attempted to use the two candidate arousal factors and the respondent's interest in the election as measures of a more general factor that mediates the effect of the strength of party identification of the strength of the respondent's vote. Unfortunately for this hypothesis, I found no support for the existence of this general factor. Instead, interest in the campaign serves as the mediating variable, and the relations of the two factors to strength of party identification and strength of vote are no longer significant when interest in the campaign is controlled (Gillespie, 1994) . In terms of the searchlight hypothesis, interest in the campaign is analogous to the optimum level of urgency required by the attentional process, while the two arousal factors, after 11 This quadratic function would account for the "positivity offset" and "negativity bias" discussed extensively by Cacioppo, et. al. (1999) . In terms of valence and arousal, positivity offset represents the positive effect of valence on arousal as valence increases from a (hypothetical) baseline to some optimal, moderate level. The negativity bias represents the negative effect of valence on arousal as arousal increases from moderate to high levels. This relation, of course, resembles the J-curve between stress and learning first observed at the beginning of the twentieth century. 12 Based on the analysis of emotion words conducted by Heise and his associates (1988), Osgood and Tannenbaum (1957) , and Shaver, et. al. (1987) , the dimension of "potency" is an obvious candidate for a third emotion dimension. Despite the theoretical and empirical rationale for this dimension, uncovering its existence has proved elusive. The self-administered manikin developed by Lang and his associates, for example, contains a bipolar scale designed to measure this dimension: a series of otherwise identical manikins that very in size from small to large (Bradley, et. al., 1994) . They dropped this dimension in their research program, however, because of its high correlation with valence. Lutz's multidimensional scaling of Ifaluk emotion words, on the other hand, yielded a two-dimensional solution in which potency, rather than arousal, was the second dimension after valence (Lutz, 1986) . Social relations on the Ifaluk atoll, however, were strongly hierarchical, and many of emotion words pertained to feelings of deference, obligations, and rights manifested in these relations. One reason for the failure of potency to emerge in factor analyses of emotional experience is the paucity of items that capture these sentiments. (It may be that expressions of feelings about one's power vis a vis that of others may be more taboo than the expression of feelings about sex, at least in industrial and post-industrial societies.) As suggested by a consideration of criterion measures of arousal in the analysis of emotional reactions to the Reagan and Carter candidacies, the potency dimension also could represent a willingness or commitment to act, and these sentiments also are absent from emotion inventories, again, possibly because due to the difficulty of expressing them in a form to which subjects can easily respond.
controlling for interest, represent the difference between optimum and non-optimum levels of urgency and are analogous to the heat produced by a searchlight. 13 Arousal figures as a byproduct in the study of the stress process because of the fact that is part of the response to stressful situations. In terms of Selye's (1956) theory of stress, arousal supplies the urgency needed by the attention process to change things that make us feel bad and reproduce things that make us feel good. His concept of "eustress" attempts to make the point that a certain level of arousal is necessary if we are to function. Arousal feels stressful when it becomes excessive. To return to the searchlight hypothesis, stress might be thought of as too much consciousness. To move beyond the realm of speculation, however, requires studies of emotion that treat valence and arousal as possible independent variables and investigate their effects, if any, on mental and physical health. Watson, D. D. Weise, J. Vaidya, and A. Tellegen (1999) 
APPENDIX (OPTIONAL)
The Algebra of Factor Rotation
The shift in the relation between the criterion variables and the dimensions in the rotated and unrotated factor plots illustrates the consequence of rotation described in the in previous notes. Rotation changes not just the pattern of relations (or loadings) between the factors and their supposed measures but also the pattern of correlations between the factors and any variable, whether intended as a measure or not. This feature is particularly easy to demonstrate in the case of a confirmatory factor analysis that restricts the loadings to values of 1, 0, or -1. Eqs. 1 -7 use LISREL notation to make this point (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1988a) .
Consider, first, the unrotated solution specified in Eq. 1 (see the second to the last factor plot in lecture notes "Using Valence and Arousal to Study Emotional Reactions to Presidential Candidates."). In this equation "y" is a 7 x 1 column vector of the three positive and four negative emotions, " y Λ " is a 7 x 2 matrix of factor loadings, "η " is a 2
x 1 column vector of factors--valence ( v η ) and arousal ( a η )--and " ε " is a 7 x 1 column vector of measurement error terms. The need to pre-multiply the column vector of factors by the inverse of the transformation matrix follows, of course, from the elementary mathematical principle that an operation on one part of an equation requires a compensating operation somewhere else in order to preserve the equality. Cliff (1987:320) refers to this requirement as "balancing the books" in his discussion of factor rotation.
A consequence of this transformation is that, if valence and arousal are fundamental, positive and negative affect represent artifical linear combinations of these basic dimensions. Eqs. 3 and 5 present these relations. As shown by eq. 3 and eq. 4, respectively, positive affect equals arousal plus valence, while negative affect equals arousal minus valence. 14
The key implication of these relations is that the covariance of any criterion variable, x, with positive and negative affect, respectively, will be an artifical linear combination of the covariances of the criterion variable with valence and arousal. Eqs. 5 and 6 present this result formally. The covariance of x with positive affect equals sum of the covariances of x with valence and arousal, while the covariance of x with negative affect equals the covariance between x and arousal minus the covariance between x and valence.
14 It is important to remember that the question of which dimensions are fundamental is one of substance, not mathematics. If one regards positive and negative affect as fundamental, one could reverse the transformation process and express valence and arousal as artifical combinations of positive and negative affect. Eq. 3 would be rewritten as: These results show why self-reported stress correlates with negative affect but not positive affect. The positive covariance of self-reported stress with arousal augments its positive covariance with "negative" valence but cancels out its negative covariance with valence. These results also explain the behavior of these criterion variables in the first factor plot in lecture notes "Using Valence and Arousal to Study Emotional Reactions to Presidential Candidates" As suggested by the unrotated factor plot, three of the criterion variables-the Carter feeling thermometer, appraisal of Carter's positive qualities, and appraisal of Carter's negative qualities-covary with valence but not arousal. In terms of eqs. 5 and 6, these results would translaste into positive covariances of the Carter feeling thermometer and the attribution of positive qualities with positive affect and into negative covariances with negative affect. In the case of the attribution of negative leadership qualities, the result would be a negative covariance with positive affect and a positive covariance with negative affect. The first factor plot in lecture notes "Using Valence and Arousal to Study Emotional Reactions to Presidential Candidates" shows that the two measures of campaign activation-talk about politics and (no) interest in the campaigncovary with arousal but not with valence. In terms of eqs. 5 and 6, these results would translate into a positive covariance between talk about politics with both positive and negative affect and a negative covariance between no interest in politics and these two variables.
Eq. 7 extends the results of Eqs. 5 and 6 to the analysis of the emotional responses to both candidates in the 1980 election. This equation contains the 4x4 variance-covariance matrix of the positive and negative affect dimensions for both Reagan and Carter. The first two rows and columns correspond to the positive and negative affect dimensions for Reagan, while the third and fourth rows and columns correspond to the positive and negative affect dimensions for Carter. Eq. 7 presents these variances and covariances as linear combinations of the variances and covariances for the valence and arousal dimensions for the two candidates. To simplify the presentation, however, I assume that the valence -arousal covariances both within and between candidates are zero. Consequently, eq. 7 only approximates the true variance-covariance matrix. The 2x2 sub-matrix in the lower left quadrant of eq. 7 is particularly relevant to this discussion. It contains the covariances of Reagan positive and negative affect with Carter positive and negative affect. The simplifying assumptions described in the previous paragraph imply two equalities. The first is between the two main diagonal elements; the second is between the two off-diagonal elements. The first equality says that the covariance between Reagan and Carter positive affect equals the covariance between Reagan and Carter negative affect. As shown in the lower left sub-matrix, we compute them by adding the covariance between Reagan and Carter valence ( 31 σ ) to the covariance between Reagan and Carter arousal ( 42 σ ). In the case of the off-diagonal elements, our assumptions imply that the covariance between Reagan positive affect and Carter negative affect equals the covariance between Reagan negative affect and Carter positive affect. We obtain both covariances by subtracting the covariance between Reagan and Carter valence from the covariance between Reagan and Carter arousal. Tables 1a -1c in lecture notes "Using Valence and Arousal to Study Emotional Reactions to Presidential Candidates" show that the covariance between valence of the Democratic and Republican candidates is negative (although the correlation is low in the case of the 1980 election survey). The tables also show that the covariance between the arousal associated with the two candidate is positive (and, indeed, is perfect [1.0] in the case of the 1980 and 1988 surveys.) As a consequence, the two covariances in the main diagonal tend to cancel one another, while they augment one another in the off-diagonal entries.
In the case of the main diagonal entries, therefore, the apparent result is that the positive affect aroused by one candidate tends NOT to correlate with the positive affect aroused by the other candidate, and, similarly, the negative affect aroused by one candidate also tends NOT to correlate with the negative affect aroused by the other candidate. This result is contrary to what we would expect: positive affect aroused by one candidate correlating negatively with the positive affect aroused by the other candidate, and negative affect aroused by one candidate correlating negatively with the negative affect aroused by the other candidate. In contrast, the off-diagnonal entries would be closer in line to what we would expect: the positive affect aroused by one candidate would correlate positively with the negative affect aroused by the other candidate. In both cases, however, we regard these results as artifacts of the inappropriate rotation to simple structure of the proper solution that treats each emotion as measuring both valence and arousal.
